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Heads across the country turned when Wal-Mart, one of the nation's
largest private employers, decided to opt out of the workers'
compensation system in Texas in March 2012.1 Texas is the only state that
permits employers of any size to choose whether or not to subscribe to
the state's workers' compensation system.2 Those employers who choose
to not subscribe are called "nonsubscribers." 3
The workers' compensation system exists as a compromise for both
employers and employees; it permits employees injured in the course and
scope of their employment to recover compensation without proving
fault, while it protects employers from total liability.' By choosing not to
subscribe to the system, nonsubscribing employers can be responsible for
total liability if injured employees prove fault.' Whether covered by
1. Becca Aaronson, As Large Companies Opt Out, Concerns Grow for Workers'
Compensation System, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/us/
fears-grow-for-workers-compensation-system-as-large-texas-companies-opt-out.html? r=l.
2. Roo BORDELON & MIKE GEESLIN, BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE TO 'I1IE 82ND LEGISLATURE: DIVIsION OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION 5-6 (2010), available at http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/dwc/documents/
dwcbiennial2010.pdf; Aaronson, supra note 1; see Workers' Compensation, TEX. DEP'r OF1

INS., http://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013) (recognizing Texas law does not
require workers' compensation and that the only thing that may compel a Texas employer
to provide it is that employer's own customers).
3. Information for Workers' Compensation Nonsubscribers,TEX. DEP'T OF INS., http://
www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/consumer/cb007.htmi (last updated Sept. 2013).
4. Tex. Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 511 (Tex. 1995).
5. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a) (West Supp. 2012) (eliminating common
law defenses related to fault for employers who do not provide workers' compensation
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workers' compensation insurance or not, the intent of the workers'
compensation system has always been "to compensate [injured
employees] for medical costs and loss of wage earning capacity" resulting
from on-the-job injuries. 6
To encourage employer participation in the workers' compensation
system, the Texas Labor Code penalizes nonsubscribing employers by
permitting an injured employee to bring a negligence cause of action for
his or her injuries and by prohibiting the employer from using the
common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
fellow-servant doctrine in defending the claim.' In essence, this statute
can reasonably be interpreted to mean that an employer need only be
one percent negligent in causing its employee's injuries in order to permit
the employee to collect one hundred percent of his or her damages.8
However, this "penalty" is becoming obsolete as courts accept employers'
manipulation of these prohibited defenses by attacking the duty and
proximate cause elements of the plaintiff's cause of action.' The resulting
reduced threat of expensive litigation liability, as compared to relatively
expensive workers' compensation premiums, has led increasing numbers
of employers (even national employers like Wal-Mart) to become
nonsubscribers.10

I.

WHAT'S THE PROBLEM WITH NONSUBSCRIBERS?

To illustrate the problem with the current state of Texas nonsubscriber
case law, this Article will refer to the recently arbitrated case of Castillo v.

coverage, thus increasing the likelihood of full liability being attributed on the employer);
see also Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 511 ("In exchange [for providing workers' compensation],
the employer's total liability for an injury was substantially limited."); Workers'
Compensation Insurance, Tex. DiPr OF INS., http://www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/consumer/cb
030.html (last updated Apr. 2013) ("[Workers' compensation] also helps employers
because it relieves them of liability for claims and gives them certain legal protections,
including immunity from most injury lawsuits.").
6. Garcia,893 S.W.2d at 511.
7. § 406.033(a); Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Tex. 2000).
8. David W. Robertson, The Texas Employer's Liability in Tort for Injuries to an
Employee Occurring in the Course of the Employment, 24 S-L. MARY'S L.J. 1195, 1199

(1993).
9. See generally Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty", 79 S. CAL. L.
Riv. 265 (2006) (discussing the modern "no duty" decisions and how they misshape civil
law from the prior universal duty of general care).
10. See Alison Morantz, Opting Out of Workers' Compensation in Texas: A Survey of
Large, Multi-state Nonsubscribers, in REGULATION vs. LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM
ECONOMICS AND LAw 197, 219 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010), available at http://www.nber
.org/books/kess09-1 (citing lower costs as the primary reason large employers opt out); see
also Aaronson, supra note I (citing cost savings as a reason Wal-Mart opted out).
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HEB Grocery Co., L.P." Mr. Anthony Castillo, a twenty-five year old
male, was injured while working for H.E.B.,12 a nonsubscriber to the
workers' compensation system. On May 5, 2010, Mr. Castillo was driving
a forklift in the course and scope of his employment at the H.E.B. Meat
and Dairy Center in San Antonio, Texas. He was moving a co-worker's
forklift out of his workspace where his co-worker left it before going on
break. Mr. Castillo was traveling backwards with his foot unknowingly
positioned outside of the running lines of the standing forklift when he
struck a column with the forklift. His right foot was pinched between the
forklift and the column, severing four of Mr. Castillo's toes. Mr. Castillo
subsequently suffered an amputation of the remaining toe and part of his
foot. Because H.E.B. is a nonsubscriber, Mr. Castillo brought a negligence claim to recover all damages afforded him under Texas law.
At arbitration, Mr. Castillo presented evidence that he was not properly trained in accordance with H.E.B.'s own policies on safe forklift operation before the injury occurred.' He also demonstrated that H.E.B.'s
training was insufficient to protect employees from similar injuries. Despite H.E.B.'s "training efforts," during the six-month period preceding
his accident H.E.B. documented six instances in which employees were
observed operating forklifts with their foot outside the running lines of
the forklifts.14 Moreover, a substantially similar injury that involved an
employee having his foot pinned between the forklift he was driving and
a pallet occurred merely a year earlier in the same warehouse. After this
11. Castillo v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P., Case No. 70 160 00432 10 (American Arbitration Association 2011) (Lea, Arb.) (on file with the Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on
Race and Social Justice). The Espinoza Law Firm represented Mr. Castillo in this case.
The information provided regarding this case is on file with the Scholar: St. Mary's Law
Review on Race and Social Justice as well as with the authors.
12. See HE Butt Grocery, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/he-butt-grocery/
(last visited Oct. 5, 2013) (listing H.E.B. as the twelfth largest private company with 76,000
employees).
13. During the discovery process, evidence demonstrated that H.E.B.'s safety policies
and procedures and the requirements for forklift certification included: (1) classroom training; (2) taking a fifty question test; and (3) a six week period evaluation where the trainer
has the sole discretion of whether a partner passes the observation. An H.E.B. representative testified that in order to become certified, an employee must complete all three in this
order. However, the evidence presented was that Mr. Castillo never saw the video until
after his injury, the test was not properly administered, and the "evaluation" was a tenminute observation of Mr. Castillo driving the forklift up and down the aisles of the
warehouse.
14. According to the deposition testimony of H.E.B.'s Meat and Dairy Center General Manager, following the reported injuries and near-miss incidents, absolutely nothing
changed and nothing was done differently at the warehouse at which Mr. Castillo was
subsequently injured. Despite continued unsafe behavior, the training method and procedure, described above, remained exactly the same and no further safety modifications were
made.
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incident, H.E.B. discussed installing several options to protect employees
from any future injuries, but none were implemented because they would
have invalidated H.E.B.'s forklift warranties.1
Beyond not having proper training, the column Mr. Castillo struck did
not have a protector surrounding the bottom that would have provided a
cushion between the forklift and the column-preventing Mr. Castillo's
foot from being impinged. 16 Additionally, H.E.B. did not have any policies or procedures for properly storing unused equipment in a location
that did not disrupt the staging area, which would have prevented Mr.
Castillo from having to move his partner's forklift altogether.17
After presenting this evidence at arbitration, the Arbitrator determined that Mr. Castillo failed to prove H.E.B. was negligent and should
therefore receive nothing."a Despite the damning evidence presented and
Mr. Castillo's low burden of demonstrating that H.E.B., as a nonsubscriber to the workers' compensation system, was only one percent negligent in causing Mr. Castillo's injuries, the Arbitrator found that his
burden was not met. Although the Arbitrator outlined thirty findings of
15. After that incident, H.E.B. discussed four options to protect their employees from
any similar injuries: (1) placing a chain on the doorway to prohibit and discourage employees' bodies from drifting outside the running lines of the forklift; (2) placing a bar on the
doorway instead of a chain; (3) lifting the foot guard higher to keep employees' feet from
drifting outside the running lines of the forklift; and (4) placing a sensor in the doorway
that would shut off the motor if the sensor was triggered. According to the deposition
testimony of H.E.B.'s Meat and Dairy Center General Manager, following the reported
injuries and near-miss incidents, absolutely nothing was changed and absolutely nothing
was done differently. Despite the fact that H.E.B.'s employees, like Mr. Castillo, continued to unsafely operate forklifts with their limbs outside the running lines of the forklift,
the training method and procedure, described above, remained exactly the same and no
further safety modifications were made.
16. These protectors are used to prevent serious injuries to workers and damage to
columns. The column next to the one hit by Mr. Castillo had a six inch barrier around the
bottom of the pole. Had Mr. Castillo hit this column, the barrier would have stopped the
forklift and would have provided a cushion of space between the column and the forklift.
Not only did H.E.B. neglect to use these column protectors on all columns, but their head
of safety at the Meat and Dairy Center Warehouse had never even heard of them, despite
the fact that he was in charge of maintaining and upgrading safety in the warehouse.
17. H.E.B. agreed that had Mr. Castillo's co-employee's forklift not been in front of
the loading dock and had Mr. Castillo never had to move it, this accident never would have
happened. An H.E.B. representative testified in his deposition that H.E.B. previously
tried to designate areas in the warehouse for employees to park their equipment while they
went on break; however, these spaces were filled with product soon after their designation,
causing employees to leave forklifts wherever they pleased. This lack of organization, guidance, and policy as to where to leave unattended forklifts directly led to Mr. Castillo's
injury.
18. Castillo v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P., No. 70 160 00432 10, at 3 (American Arbitration Association 2011) (Lea, Arb.) (on file with the Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on
Race and Social Justice).
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fact in the final order, most of the findings focused on Mr. Castillo's own
knowledge and actions." Only one finding discussed the actions and negligence, if any, of H.E.B.2 0 This final order epitomizes the improper interpretation of Texas' nonsubscriber law and the current state of Texas
case law, directly conflicting with the plain language and legislative intent
of Texas Labor Code § 406.033.
The Texas Department of Workers' Compensation determined, as of
2012, thirty-three percent of Texas employers are nonsubscribers to the
workers' compensation system,2 1 leaving 1.7 million Texans protected
solely by Texas Labor Code § 406.033.22 The top reason cited by nonsubscribing employers for "opting-out" of the workers' compensation system
is that workers' compensation premiums are too high.2 3 In evaluating the
costs of subscription versus the costs of potential litigation, settlements,
or verdicts, the reality of the current state of Texas nonsubscriber law
seems clear-the savings to nonsubscribing employers are greater than
the exposure to liability.2 4
Evaluating the subcategory of large, national employers is even more
enlightening-seventeen percent of large employers (those with more
than 500 employees) are currently nonsubscribers. 2 5 Of these large nonsubscribing entities, approximately eighty-five percent use mandatory arbitration provisions requiring claims be brought in an arbitral rather than
judicial forum. 26 Furthermore, despite the fact that subscribing employ-

19. Id. at 1-3.
20. Id. at 2.
21. TEx. DEP'Tr OF INS. WORKERS' COMP. RESEARCH AND EVALUATION GRP., EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION IN rHE TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM: 2012 EsnMATES 6 (2012), available at http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/wcreg/documents/2012_Non
sub.pdf.
22. BORDELON & GEESLIN, supra note 2, at 6.
23. Jason Ohana, Note, Texas Elective Workers' Compensation:A Model of Innova-

tion?, 2 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 323, 346 (2011).
24. See id. at 351 (listing two ways nonsubscribers reduce workplace injury cost of
risk: (1) provide no benefits and take a gamble with litigation as it arises or (2) "entice its
employees to waive their ... negligence claims or agree to arbitrate their injury claims in
exchange for occupational injury benefits").
25. TEx. DEP'T OF INS., supra note 21, at 8.

26. Morantz, supra note 10, at 230. Morantz also reported that litigation trends varied
by the presence or absence of arbitration agreements as did reports of having "trouble"
with litigation. Id. Furthermore, "[i]n 2008, [seventy-four] percent of non-subscribing employers reported knowing the arbitrator in arbitration proceedings." Ohana, supra note
23, at 344. The enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements in nonsubscriber cases is
one of the many problems in the current state of Texas law, as evidenced by Anthony
Castillo's case.
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ers are immune from suit 2 7 while nonsubscribing employers are vulnerable to liability, many view nonsubscription as a means to reduce
litigation.2 8 Mindful that § 406.033 was intended to serve as a "penalty"
statute, textual examination of Texas Labor Code § 406.033 and the past
four Texas Supreme Court nonsubscriber cases, demonstrates readily apparent inconsistencies between legislative intent and judicial interpretation. This article demonstrates how systemic misapplication of the statute
and common law, to the benefit of employers, is detrimental to Texas
citizens.
Part II discusses the text and basic history of the statute. Part III focuses on the past four Texas Supreme Court nonsubscriber opinions, beginning with the historic Keng29 opinion and then considering the
subsequent three opinions that substantially limited the protections afforded under the nonsubscriber statute. Part IV(a) then analyzes the assumption of risk defense and how it is utilized in defeating an injured
employee's prima facie case. Part IV(b) demonstrates how the contributory negligence defense is also currently used in defeating a plaintiff's
duty and/or proximate cause element of his cause of action.
In order to demonstrate the application of these affirmative defenses,
this Article attacks specific case citations implicating application of assumption of risk and contributory negligence by drawing parallels to
other personal injury causes of action arising in Texas and other states, as
well as causes arising under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA),o a substantially similar statute to Texas Labor Code § 406.033.
In so doing, this Article provides examples demonstrating proper application and analysis of nonsubscriber cases within the parameters of the
Texas statute.

27. The only suit an injured employee of a subscribing employer can bring falls under
Texas Labor Code § 451, which protects injured employees from being retaliatory discharged, and Texas Labor Code § 408.001, which permits suits for exemplary damages arising from a worker's death caused by the employer's gross negligence. Tix. LAB. CoDE
ANN. §§ 451.001-451.002, 408.001. Section 451 of the Labor Code, however, does not apply to nonsubscribing employers, leaving injured employees vulnerable and unprotected
from injuries and subsequent discharges. Tex. Mexican Ry. Co. v. Bouchet, 963 S.W.2d 52,
56 (Tex. 1998); see generally Phil Hardberger, Texas Workers' Compensation:A Ten-Year
Survey-Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations, 32 S r. MARY's L.J. 1, 15-19 (2000)
(discussing Bouchet and recommending employees of nonsubscribers also be protected by
statute as "[w]orkers do not choose to be injured" and are a "prime target for
discrimination").
28. Morantz, supra note 10, at 218 tbl.8.3.
29. Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2000).
30. 45 U.S.C. H§ 51-60 (2006); see generally Michael D. Green, The Federal Employers' Liability Act: Sense and Nonsense about Causation, 61 DiEPAui L. Riv. 503, 504-09
(2012) (discussing the history of the Federal Employers' Liability Act).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEXAS NONSUBSCRIBER STATUTE

Original Texas Workers' Compensation Act

Workers' compensation statutes were intended to transfer economic
loss resulting from on-the-job accidents and injuries from the workers to
the industry in which they are employed and ultimately to the consuming
public. "Motivating the enactment of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act was the broad economic theory that industrial accident costs
should be chargeable to the industries as part of their overhead expenses." 3 2 One century ago, the Texas Legislature decided that employers, not employees, should shoulder the expense of work-related
accidents as part of the cost of doing business.
In 1913 the thirty-third Texas Legislature enacted the original Texas
Workmen's Compensation Act,3 4 which was modeled after a similar Massachusetts statute.3 s "This Act was elective in so far as the employer was
concerned, with abrogation of the common law defenses on a failure to
elect the Act, but was compulsory so far as the employee was concerned." 3 6 With subscribers the right to receive compensation, valued at
sixty percent of lost earning capacity37 during the time the employee was
unable to work, was in no way dependent upon the fault of either the
employee or employer; the only relevant matter was whether the injury
was sustained in the course and scope of employment.3 8 The original Act
provided the following: (a) a system to compensate the worker, without
regard to fault, for injuries sustained in the course of employment; (b) an
administrative board for efficient resolution procedures; and (c) a statesupervised employers' insurance company to which employers could elect
to subscribe.3 9
31. Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. v. Konvicka, 197 F.2d. 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1952).
32. Texas Emp'rs' Ins. Ass'n v. Unites States, 558 F.2d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 1977).
33. See Act of Apr. 16, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 179, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 429 (creating the original Texas workers' compensation coverage and system).
34. Id.
35. J. JOHN LAWLER & GAIL GATEs LAWLER, TEXAS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW § 15 (1938).
36. Id.
37. Cf TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.103(a) (West 2006) (providing subscribers' injured employees entitlement to receive seventy to seventy-five percent of lost earning
capacity).
38. LAWLER & LAWLER, supra note 35.

39. Act of Apr. 16, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 179, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 429, 429. The
Act's preamble states this was:
An Act relating to employers' liability and providing for the compensation of certain
employe[e]s and their representatives and beneficiaries, for personal injuries sustained
in the course of employment, and for deaths resulting from such injuries, and to provide and determine in what cases compensation shall be paid, and to make the pay-
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The centerpiece of the original Act was the "exclusivity provision" or
"immunity provision," which gave rise to the employer category of nonsubscribers. The 1913 nonsubscriber provision stated:
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by an
employee in the course of his employment, or for the death resulting
from personal injury so sustained, it shall not be a defense:
1. That the employee was guilty of contributory negligence; [but in
such event the damages shall be diminished in the proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to such employee, provided that no such employee who may be injured or killed shall
be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence where the
violation by such employer of any statute enacted for the safety
of the employees contributed to the injury or death of such
employee.]
2.

That the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow
employee.

3.

That the employee had assumed the risk of the injury incident to
his employment; but such employer may defend in such action
on the ground that the injury was caused by the willful intention
of the employee to bring about such injury [or was so caused
while the employee was in a state of intoxication].

4.

[Provided, however,] in all such actions against an employer who
is not a subscriber as defined hereafter in this Act, it shall be
necessary to a recovery for the plaintiff to prove negligence of
such employer or some agent or servant of such employer acting
within the general scope of his employment. 4 0

The original Act was amended in 1917, changing the manner in which
injuries were processed and evaluated by subscribing employers and their
insurance companies, but maintaining the same system for employers that
did not subscribe to the workers' compensation system. 41 There have

ment thereof the more certain and prompt by the creation of an insurance association
to insure and guarantee such payments and an industrial accident board for the investigation of claims and for the adjudication thereof for consenting parties . ...
Id.
40. Id. at 429-30. This is the text of the original statute from 1913, with exceptions. In
1917, the bracketed portions numbers one and four were omitted, while the bracketed
portion in number three was added. 1925 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 2391, 8306 § 1; LAWL-ER
& LAwLER, supra note 35, at 33.
41. See LAwLER & LAWLER, supra note 35, at 22 (discussing changes made by the 1917
amendments to the statute).
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been numerous small amendments to the Act, but it remains fundamentally unchanged since 1917.42
B.

Current State of the Workers' Compensation Act

The current version falls under § 406.033 of the Texas Labor Code.
Originally codified in 1913, the nonsubscriber provision remains nearly
identical to the original Act's language:
(a) In an action against an employer by or on behalf of an employee
who is not covered by workers' compensation insurance obtained in
the manner authorized by [this code] to recover damages for personal injuries or death sustained by an employee in the course and
scope of the employment, it is not a defense that:
(1) the employee was guilty of contributory negligence;
(2) the employee assumed the risk of injury or death; or
(3) the injury or death was caused by the negligence of a fellow
employee.43
The current statute further delineates the structure of an employee's personal injury action against his or her nonsubscribing employer.4 4 It expressly defines which defenses are available and
unavailable to nonsubscribing employers and also defines the employee's burden of proof, stating, "[T]he plaintiff must prove negligence of the employer or of an agent or servant of the employer
acting within the general scope of the agent's or servant's employment."45 Section 406.033(c) identifies the only defenses implicating
the employee's conduct upon which a nonsubscribing employer may
rely: (1) "the employee intended to bring about the injury" or (2) the
injury occurred "while the employee was intoxicated."46
Therefore, in looking at Texas Labor Code § 406.033 in its entirety, as
long as employees are working in the course and scope of their employment, are not intoxicated, and don't intentionally cause their injuries, employees are entitled to full compensation for all damages they prove were
caused by their employer's negligence. 4 '
The unavailability of the defenses of assumption of risk, fellow servant
doctrine, and contributory negligence "means that an employer whose
42. Id.
43. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a) (West Supp. 2012).

44.
45.
46.
47.

Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 350-51 (Tex. 2000).
§ 406.033(d); see also Keng, 23 S.W.3d at 351.
§ 406.033(c).
Id. § 406.033(a)-(d).
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fault, however slight, was a proximate cause of the injuries will owe full
damages" and cannot reduce the amount of damages based on the injured employee's own actions.48 "Theoretically the employer will owe
full damages even when the facts suggest that the employer's fault was as
little as [one percent] of the total causative fault and that the injured employee's fault was as much as [ninety-nine percent] of the total causative
fault."4 9 By eliminating the listed common law defenses, statutory intent
is clear-the victim's fault should not defeat or diminish recovery in a
nonsubscriber case.so
It is evident the Legislature intended to induce employers to insure
employees and impose a penalty on any employers who elected not to
carry workers' compensation insurance."' Contributory negligence, assumed risk, and fellow servant defenses are statutorily abolished.52 Thus,
the Legislature intended to deprive a nonsubscribing employer of these
defenses.
In addition to the Legislature's strong language in favor of injured employees, the Judiciary has continually emphasized the need to construe
the Workers' Compensation Act liberally in order to protect injured employees.5 4 In Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin II,51 the Texas Supreme Court
stated:
Workers' compensation is based on the principle that the cost of
medical services and benefits provided is part of doing business and
thus is borne directly by the employer, and ultimately by the general
public, as part of the cost of goods and services. The continued effectiveness of the workers' compensation scheme depends on the continued ability to spread the risk of such losses. 56

48. Robertson, supra note 8.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1201.
51. See Gary Thornton, Litigation Involving Non-Subscribers to Workers' Compensation Insurance,54 Tix. B.J. 318, 318 (1991) (recognizing that the only penalty imposed by
the statute on nonsubscribing employers is the elimination of these common law defenses).
52. Tux. LAB. CODF ANN. § 406.033(a) (West Supp. 2012).
53. See Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 511 (Tex. 1995)
("Although employers are allowed to opt out of the [workers' compensation] system, the
[Texas Workers' Compensation A]ct discouraged this choice by abolishing all the traditional common law defenses for nonsubscribers.").
54. See, e.g., In re Poly Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 350 (Tex. 2006) (noting the need for
liberal construction); Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. 2000) (referencing the
policy of liberally construing the statute); Huffman v. S. Underwriters, 128 S.W.2d 4, 6
(1939) ("It is the settled policy of this State to construe liberally the provisions of
the . . . [f]aw, in order to effectuate the purposes for which it was enacted.").
55. Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin II, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985).
56. Id. at 407.
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Considering that the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to
protect injured workers and also considering that the intent of § 406.033
is to encourage employers to subscribe to the workers' compensation system, it is clear that employers who opt out of the system should not be
favored by courts. The onus is upon employers in choosing whether or
not to subscribe; thus, employers should be the party bearing the burden
of such calculation rather than employees. However, as demonstrated by
the past three Texas Supreme Court nonsubscriber decisions, employees
are paradoxically forced to bear this burden because employers are making allegations of contributory negligence and assumption of risk in their
defense of injured employees' negligence causes of action.
C.

Plaintiffs Negligence Cause of Action

Texas courts have defined precisely which duties an employer owes to
its employees. Thus, in order for injured plaintiffs to prove their cause of
action against nonsubscribing employers, they must demonstrate that employers first owed and breached one of the defined duties. Importantly,
Texas courts hold that "[a]n employer has a duty to use ordinary care in
providing a safe workplace."ss In so doing, "[i]t must, for example, warn
an employee of the hazards of employment and provide needed safety
equipment or assistance."" Additionally, an employer must furnish safe
machinery and instrumentalities with which its employees are to work 60
57. Compare David F. Johnson & Peyton N. Smith, The First Step in Nonsubscriber
Employee Injury Suits is Defining the Scope of the Employers' Duty-It Affects Everything,
59 BAYLOR L. REv. 381, 387-88 (2007) (identifying the duty element as the first which
should be attacked by nonsubscribing employers, as courts generally begin with "broad
statements about an employer owing a non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe
workplace" and then "retreat from this broad duty language"), with Esper & Keating,
supra note 9, at 273 (insisting that in a negligence cause of action, duty is easily found).
Esper and Keating further state, "The existence of a duty of care means that the norms of
negligence law determine the rights and obligations of the parties ... The absence of a duty
means either that some other body of law . . . determines the rights of the parties to the
harm, or that no ... law does." Id.
58. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006); see, e.g., Farley v. M M
Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975), abrogatedon othergrounds by Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978) (recognizing "the duty to furnish a reasonably
safe place in which to labor").
59. Kroger, 197 S.W.3d at 794; see, e.g., Farley, 529 S.W.2d at 754, abrogatedon other
grounds by Parker,565 S.W.2d at 512 (adhering to the rule of a "duty to warn employees
as to the hazards of their employment").
60. See Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170, 186 n.45 (Tex. 2004)
(citing the language of Farley v. M M Cattle Co.); Farley, 529 S.W.2d at 754, abrogatedon
other grounds by Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 512 ("It is well established that an employer has
certain nondelegable and continuous duties to his employees . . . [including] the duty to
furnish reasonably safe instrumentalities with which employees are to work.").
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and provide adequate assistance under the circumstances for the performance of required work.6' An employer has a "duty to warn or caution an employee of a danger . . . when (a) the employment is of a

dangerous character requiring skill and caution for its safe and proper
discharge, and (2) the employer is aware of the danger and has reason to
know the employee is unaware." 6 2 An employer must also "instruct employees in the safe use and handling of products and equipment used in
and around an employer's premises or facilities," and "adequately hire,
train, and supervise employees. "6
Upon demonstration that an employer has breached one of its duties,
employees must next prove that the breach was the proximate cause of
their injuries-requiring proof of cause-in-fact and foreseeability. 6 4
Cause-in-fact requires the act or omission to be a substantial factor in
causing the injury, "without which the harm would not have occurred." 65
To be a substantial factor, the act or omission must have "such an effect
in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause,
using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea
of responsibility," instead of simply the "so-called 'philosophic sense,'

61. See Gomez, 146 S.W.3d at 186 n.45; Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex.
1995) (explaining that the duty to provide a safe work environment includes the duty to
provide adequate assistance); Farley, 529 S.W.2d at 754; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Coker,
204 S.W.2d 977, 978 (Tex. 1947) (reiterating that the law imposes both of the listed duties).
62. Nat'l Convenience Stores Inc. v. Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
63. Patino v. Complete Tire, Inc., 158 S.W.3d 655, 660 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet.
denied); see also, Castillo v. Gared, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, pet. denied) (recognizing the duty to adequately hire, train and supervise
employees).
64. Compare e.g., Excel Corp. v. Apodaca, 81 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. 2002) (discussing
the proximate cause element of negligence) with CSX Termination, Inc. v. McBride, 564
U.S.
, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (2011) (discussing the proximate cause element changing
based on the language of FELA). In CSX, the majority held that FELA and the Jones Act,
which both prohibit the use of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, do "not
incorporate 'proximate cause' standards developed in nonstatutory common-law tort actions." Id. at - 131 S. Ct. at 2634. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that "reasonable foreseeability of harm" was the standard in determining negligence. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct.
at 2643 (quoting Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 117 (1963)); see
generally Kyle W. Ubl, Note, The (Un)foreseen Effects of Abrogating Proximate Causation
in CSX Transportation,Inc. v. McBride: The New Role of Foreseeability Under FELA and
the Jones Act, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2261 (2012) (discussing the impact of McBride on
the proximate causation standard).
65. E.g., Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995).
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which includes every one of the great number of events without which
any happening would not have occurred."6 6
Foreseeability requires that the negligent actor-assuming reasonable
intelligence-anticipated, or should have anticipated, the danger his or
her negligence created.67 The exact injury need not be foreseen. Instead,
foreseeability is satisfied when the injury is of a general character that
could reasonably be anticipated. 6 ' Finally, causation may be based on
either direct or circumstantial evidence, 6 9 but cannot be supported by
"mere conjecture, guess, or speculation."70
If a plaintiff is able to meet this burden, he or she should recover all
damages resulting from the defendant's negligence. 7 ' However, Texas
courts are unreasonably complicating this analysis by limiting the broad
scope of duty and liability placed upon employers 72 and by taking into
account the employee's actions, as demonstrated by the four most recent
Texas Supreme Court nonsubscriber decisions.
III.

A.

CURRENT STATE OF TEXAS NONSUBSCRIBER CASE LAW

Kroger Co. v. Keng 3

Keng is a seminal case in Texas nonsubscriber law, especially in the
minds of those advocating for worker rights. Sonja Keng was employed
in a Kroger deli in Houston, Texas.7 4 Ms. Keng was usually responsible
for helping customers, making sandwiches, and selling pastries;7 5 however, on the date of her injury, her supervisor asked her to remove outdated pie boxes from the freezer.7 6 While she was climbing down the
ladder to exit the freezer, three boxes fell from the top shelf and struck

v.

66. RESTATEMlENTr (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 431 cmt. a (1965); see, e.g., Union Pump Co.
Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. 1995) (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of-

TOwrs

§ 431

cmt. a (1965)).

67. E.g., El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. 1987).
68. E.g., Lee Lewis Constr. Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 785 (Tex. 2001).
69. E.g., Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1992).
70. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472 at 477.
71. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (West Supp. 2012) (removing contributory
negligence and assumption of risk from the equation in a negligence claim against a nonsubscriber). Plaintiff is entitled to full recovery if her burden is met. Id.
72. For example, courts have limited the duty element by stating that an employer is
not "an insurer of its employees' employees' safety." E.g., Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197
S.W.3d 793, 794-95 (Tex. 2006); Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114,117 (Tex. 1996); Exxon
Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1993).
73. Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2000).
74. Kroger Co. v. Keng, 976 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998), aff'd, 23 S.W.3d
347 (Tex. 2000).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Ms. Keng, causing her to fall and strike her chest on a cart in the
freezer. After her injury and subsequent termination, Ms. Keng filed a
nonsubscriber action against her former employer.7 8
Kroger responded by asserting that Ms. Keng's conduct either caused
or contributed to cause the incident and argued that it was entitled to
submit evidence of Ms. Keng's negligence to the jury under Texas' comparative fault statute.7 9 Kroger argued that Texas Labor Code § 406.033
only prevented the common law defense of contributory negligence from
being a complete bar to recovery and did not prevent Kroger from asserting the statutory defense of comparative responsibility.o
In resolving the conflicting results from lower appellate courts, the
Texas Supreme Court looked at intent of the Legislature in determining
whether or not § 406.033 precluded a nonsubscribing employer from asserting the defense of comparative fault, thereby making a distinction between common law comparative responsibility and the statutorily
adopted comparative fault." The court held, based on the plain meaning
of the statute, comparative responsibility could not be used because it "is
not identified as an available defense" under § 406.033(c).8 2 Based on
the language enacted by the Legislature and subsequent (in)actions, the
court reasoned,
Although the Legislature has had many opportunities since it enacted the comparative-negligence scheme in 1973 to amend section
406.033 to allow for a comparative-responsibility determination ... it
has not done so. Absent express legislative action, we cannot conclude that when the Legislature enacted the statutory comparativenegligence scheme, it intended to lessen the penalty imposed on employers who choose not to subscribe to workers' compensation
insurance.
Whether it is called contributory negligence or comparative responsibility, the court found that both require proof that the injured employee's
own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries.8 4 Both "contemplate[ ] an injured [employee's] failure to use ordinary care in regard to
his or her own safety." 85 In this case, Ms. Keng was able to prove that
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Keng, 23 S.W.3d at 347.
Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 349.

82. Id. at 350; see TEx. LAB. CoDi. ANN. § 406.033(c) (West Supp. 2012) (enumerating
intent or intoxication on the part of the employee as the nonsubscriber's only defenses).
83. Keng, 23 S.W.3d at 351.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 351-52.
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Kroger was at least one percent negligent in causing her injuries, and
thus, any evidence of her own negligence in climbing the ladder and carrying boxes down could not be submitted to the jury, whether Kroger
attempted to introduce the evidence as comparative fault or comparative
responsibility."
Since taking this bold, decisive stance in favor of protecting injured
employees, the Texas Supreme Court has scaled back its interpretation of
the nonsubscriber statute in favor of the employer in its next three nonsubscriber decisions.
B.

Kroger Co. v. Elwood8 7

Billy Elwood, a Kroger employee, was injured when a car door shut on
his hand while he was transferring goods from a grocery cart into a customer's vehicle." Mr. Elwood presented evidence that Kroger did not
properly train him on how to maneuver carts in the store's sloped parking
lot, did not advise him to have a second employee aid him while working
in the sloped lot, did not provide a second employee to aid him, did not
train him in avoiding injury while loading goods into customers' vehicles,
and did not provide carts with locking wheels, despite the fact that its
parking lot was sloped.89 The jury and appellate court both found Kroger's negligence a proximate cause of Mr. Elwood's injuries. 90 However,
the Texas Supreme Court reversed the jury and appellate court's ruling,
holding that Kroger did not have a duty to warn Mr. Elwood of the dangers of placing his hand in a doorjamb and Mr. Elwood had not presented
evidence that additional equipment or assistance were necessary to perform the job safely.9 '
In its decision, the court infamously held that "an employer is not an
insurer of its employees' safety." 92 It further determined that while employers have "a duty to use ordinary care in providing a safe workplace,"
86. See id. at 352-53 ("We therefore hold that a nonsubscribing employer is not entitied to a jury question on its employee's alleged comparative responsibility."). Kroger
argued: (1) the injury was not foreseeable; (2) Keng's actions "caused the boxes to fall" by
placing and positioning them because of the way she position and placed them on the
shelves; (3) "Keng was performing a typical and usual task of any grocery store employee,
e.g. moving stock from grocery store shelves; and" (4) the ladder itself played no part in
was not a producing cause of the injury thus, Kroger's "violation of [its own] safety rules
was not determinative." Kroger Co. v. Keng, 976 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Tex. App.-Tyler l998),
affd, 23 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2000).
87. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2006).
88. Id. at 794.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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they have "no duty to warn of hazards that are commonly known or already appreciated by the employee."" Additionally, the court held that
employers have "no duty to provide equipment or assistance that is unnecessary to the job's safe performance." 9 4 Lastly, the court found that
"when an employee's injury results from performing the same character
of work that employees in that position have always done, an employer is
not liable if there is no evidence that the work is unusually precarious."9 5
Despite the jury's finding of negligence and the appellate court's agreement, the Texas Supreme Court ruled there was no evidence that loading
groceries on a sloped parking lot was unusually dangerous, no evidence
that such an injury was foreseeable, no evidence that Mr. Elwood should
have been trained, and no evidence that carts with locking wheels or additional assistance were necessary to safely load goods into customers'
vehicles. 96 The court went as far as to consider Mr. Elwood's own testimony, in which he stated that he knew that it was dangerous to place his
hand in a vehicle's doorjamb, as evidence that Kroger owed no duty to
him. 97
Without even hearing oral argument," the Texas Supreme Court held
that Mr. Elwood should recover nothing in his negligence cause of action
against his nonsubscribing employer, despite the jury's finding of negligence. 99 In so doing, the Court focused on the fact that Mr. Elwood was
performing the task that Kroger hired him to perform at the time of his
injury.
C.

Jack in the Box v. Skiles

00

While delivering food product to one of Jack in the Box's restaurants,
Wade Skiles was injured when he climbed over the broken lift gate on the
back of the delivery truck.' At the time of the delivery the hydraulic lift
gate was inoperable.1 0 2 Mr. Skiles warned Jack in the Box's restaurant
manager of the malfunctioning lift gate, and the manager indifferently
93. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794.
94. Id. at 795.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Chief Justice Phil Hardberger, Juries Under Siege, 30 ST. MARY's L.J. 1, 4
(1998) (discussing the trend for courts to overreach their judicial bounds). The article also
stated, most appropriately, "Legal tools of 'no duty,' 'no proximate cause,' 'no evidence,'
'insufficient evidence,' 'unreliable experts,' 'unqualified experts,' and 'junk science' wiped
out many jury verdicts." Id.
99. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 795 (Tex. 2006).
100. Jack in the Box, Inc. v. Skiles, 221 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2007).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 567.
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responded that the restaurant needed hamburger meat for the lunchtime
rush.'0 3 Mr. Skiles then reported the malfunctioning equipment to a supervisor at the chain's distribution center.' 0 4 To get the store its urgently
required supplies, Mr. Skiles told his supervisor that he would attempt to
use a ladder to climb over the lift gate.' 0 5 There was evidence that his
supervisor responded affirmatively to this solution. 1 0 6 Mr. Skiles used the
store's ladder to climb over the lift gate, tearing ligaments in his knees in
the process, which led him to bring a nonsubscriber cause of action
against Jack in the Box.1 0 7
Jack in the Box argued that there was no evidence it owed a duty to or
breached a duty to warn Mr. Skiles of an obviously dangerous condition. 0 s Relying on Keng, Mr. Skiles argued "that an employer has a duty
to warn employees of dangerous activities that are not a normal part of
their duties," which naturally includes using a ladder to climb over a broken lift gate.' 0 9
The Texas Supreme Court, however, once again sided with the employer, citing its previous decision in Elwood for support.1 10 The court
found: (1) unloading food product was part of Mr. Skiles general character of work, as it was a regular part of his job; (2) Mr. Skiles was trained
on how to respond when the lift gate would not open-he was trained to
call for help; and (3) Mr. Skiles voluntarily made the decision to use a
ladder to enter the trailer.1 11 Based on these findings, Jack in the Box did
not owe a duty to warn Skiles of the danger posed by using a ladder to
climb over a lift gate. 1' 2 Again, the injured employee took nothing, despite evidence that the employer did not provide reasonably safe equipment to its employee, failed to assist the employee upon discovery of the
malfunctioning equipment, approved of the decision to use a ladder to
climb the gate, and failed to warn Mr. Skiles of the potential dangers in
completing a task that was not a normal part of his everyday job.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Skiles, 221 S.W.3d at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 569.
Id.
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3

Barbara Goss, a Brookshire Grocery Company employee, was injured
when she tripped over a lowboy cart in the deli cooler."' Ms. Goss went
to retrieve items from the cooler that was fully stocked in preparation of
the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday.' 15 To maneuver through the freezer,
she had to step around lowboy carts loaded two to three feet high with
frozen goods.1 1 6 Once she retrieved the goods and turned around, she hit
her shin on the lowboy and strained her back while attempting to catch
her fall.'" Ms. Goss subsequently brought a negligence cause of action
against Brookshire, a nonsubscriber to the workers' compensation system, based on Brookshire's negligence in "fail[ing] to warn employees of
the risks of maneuvering around lowboy carts.""' The jury and appellate
court agreed with Ms. Goss, finding Brookshire negligent." 9 The Texas
Supreme Court, however, again overturned the jury's verdict in favor of
the nonsubscribing employer. 2 0
The Texas Supreme Court relied on its prior rulings in Elwood and
Skiles, again reciting that "an employer 'owes no duty to warn of hazards
that are commonly known or already appreciated by the employee.' "12l
The court found that storing the loaded lowboy in the cooler was not
unusually dangerous and that it was easily visible, as Ms. Goss saw it
when she entered the cooler.12 2
The appellate court held that Brookshire's argument, which the Texas
Supreme Court adopted, applied the "assumption of risk" affirmative defense that was not available to them; however, the Texas Supreme Court
held that attacking the duty element of the plaintiff's cause of action "is
not an affirmative defense". 123 The court distinguished assumption of
risk from duty, stating, "[I]t 'depends on a legal analysis balancing a number of factors, including the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury,
and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant.' "124
Again, without hearing oral argument, the Texas Supreme Court balanced policy "priorities" and placed the burden squarely upon the injured

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Goss, 262 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2008).
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Goss, 262 S.W.3d at 794.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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deli worker rather than the nonsubscribing employer,'25 which opted out
of the workers' compensation system on its own volition
E. How Did These Cases Affect Castillo v. H.E.B.?
In light of these recent Texas Supreme Court nonsubscriber cases, it is
apparent how these rulings influenced Mr. Castillo's arbitration. The Arbitrator found Mr. Castillo knew he should not operate the forklift with
his foot outside the running lines of the vehicle; therefore, H.E.B. owed
him no duty to warn of the dangers, as they were open and obvious. 12 6
Furthermore, Mr. Castillo was performing his ordinary job duties, 1 27 and
the Arbitrator found it particularly persuasive that the Meat and Dairy
Center warehouse calculated thousands of hours of forklift operation
without a similar injury. 1 2 8 The basis of the Arbitrator's findings is inextricably linked to the analysis of the three latest cases cited above: Elwood, Skiles, and Goss.
However, these cases are distinguishable from Mr. Castillo's case. The
job Mr. Castillo performed was not a pedestrian activity and required
significant training in the operation of a forklift, which Mr. Castillo argued was not properly provided. Additionally, H.E.B. knew of the potential danger, as similar accident occurred two years prior, and H.E.B.
knew t its employees were still operating their forklifts with their limbs
outside the running lines of the equipment. Thus, inquiry should have
focused on H.E.B.'s actions or inactions as negligence, not upon Mr. Castillo's actions.
Careful review of the basis of these three Texas Supreme Court nonsubscriber opinions and the way its opinions were applied in
Mr. Castillo's arbitration shows the Court has found assumption of risk
and contributory negligence preclude a finding that a duty has been
breached. This faulty analysis incorrectly elevates the Plaintiff's actions
as the focus of the inquiry, when the focus should be on the Defendant's
actions, and whether those actions or inactions constitute negligence.

125. Id.
126. See Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006) (holding the danger
was open and obvious).
127. See id. at 795 (citing the "character of work" no-duty rule).
128. See Castillo v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P., No. 70 160 00432 10, at I (American
Arbitration Association 2011) (Lea, Arb.) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review On Race and Social Justice) (citing training Castillo received). Mr. Castillo had over
600 hours of experience operating forklifts. Id.
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MANIPULATING THE DEFENSES OF AssumiroN OF RISK AND
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN NONSUBSCRIBER CASE LAW

Assumption of Riskl 2 9
Prior to the shift from contributory negligence to comparative fault,

courts recognized three distinct forms of assumption of risk: express assumption of risk, primary implied assumption of risk, and secondary implied assumption of risk.' 30 Express assumption of risk has been

specifically disallowed by Texas Labor Code § 406.033(e),"' and thus is
not a factor in most nonsubscriber cases.
Major implications of assumption of risk in this context reside within
distinctions between primary implied assumption of risk and secondary
implied assumption of risk and how those doctrines are applied.' 3 2 If primary implied assumption of risk was found, a court would hold that a
plaintiff failed to establish the element of duty or breach of duty and thus
failed to establish the prima facie case, and whereas if secondary implied
assumption of risk was found, a court would examine the nature and
quality of the injured party's conduct to determine if it was reasonable. 3 1

129. At common law, assumption of risk completely barred recovery by the plaintiff.
53 Ti~x. Juin. 31) NEGLIGENCE § 74 (2007).

In distinguishing assumption of risk and

contributory negligence, courts concluded that "assumption of risk is a matter of
knowledge of the danger and intelligent acquiescence in it, and that to the extent that this
can be found recovery will be denied," whereas "contributory negligence is a matter of
some fault or departure from the standard of reasonable conduct, however unwilling or
protesting the plaintiff may be." Masters v. N.Y.C. Cent. R.R. Co., 70 N.E.2d 898, 903
(Ohio 1947); VINcENT R. JoHNsoN & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAw 754

(4th ed. 2009) (citing the language from Masters in its introduction to assumption of risk).
130. See generally JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 754-79.
131. Tax. LAIn. Coo[ ANN. § 406.033(e) (West Supp. 2012). The Texas Legislature

enacted § 406.033(e) in 2001 after the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence v. CDB
Services, Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2001), which rejected public-policy challenges to the
validity of an employee's pre-injury agreement to limit a nonsubscriber employer's liability
in exchange for benefits. Storage & Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d 190, 192 (Tex.
2004). The Texas Legislature specifically made any pre-injury waiver of a cause of action
under Texas Labor Code § 406.033(a) void and unenforceable. § 406.033(e). "Section
406.033 was amended, effective September 1, 2005, to include subsection (f), which puts
limits on the circumstances under which an employee may waive his or her rights to sue a
non-subscribing employer to recover damages for personal injuries or death." Blackshire
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-329-TJW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84237, at * 6 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 17, 2010); accord Act of June 1, 2005, 97th Leg., R.S., ch. 265, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws
469, 499 (codified as amended at § 406.033(f)).
132. See generally JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 766-779 (outlining and discussing the differences between primary implied assumption of risk and secondary implied
assumption of risk).
133. Dale L. Moore, Please Watch Your Language!: The Chronic Problem Of Assumption Of Risk, 61 CAT. U. L. REv. 175, 177-78 (2011).
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"Primary assumption of risk is appropriately invoked when an activity's
inherent risk manifests itself."' 3 4 It is applied by demonstrating that the
defendant owes no duty to protect the plaintiff from risks that are inherent in a particular activity or course of endeavor.135 In the employment
context, this includes risks associated with the particular character of the

work performed.1 3 6
Secondary implied assumption of risk applies when there is evidence
that an individual "(1) subjectively appreciated the risk, (2) voluntarily
elected to confront it, and (3) manifested a willingness to relieve the defendant of any obligation of care or had no expectation that care would
be exercised."' 37 The idea that the plaintiff's confrontation of the risk
was free and voluntary is of critical importance to this doctrine.13 " Based
on this idea, the voluntariness of confronting risk in the employment context is called into doubt based on the relationship a worker has to his or
her job.
i.

Assumption of Risk in the Employment Context

Assumption of risk, or volenti non fit injuria, 39 "first appeared in recorded English case history in 1305."140 In the United States, the doctrine "developed in response to the general impulse of common law
courts [in the early nineteenth century] to insulate the employer as much
as possible from bearing the human overhead."141 In both England and
the United States, principles of laissez-faire economics anchored judicial
134. Id. at 184.
135. See JoHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 767 (citing Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d
964, 968 (N.Y. 1986)). Primary assumption of risk includes "risks ... incidental to a relationship of free association between the defendant and the plaintiff in the sense that either
party is perfectly free to engage in the activity or not as he wishes"). Id.
136. Cf id. at 769-72 (discussing primary implied assumption of risk applying most
notoriously in recreational settings as people assume risks which are intrinsic to the
activity).
137. Id. at 775 (stating when courts speak of assumption of risk in these terms, they
are discussing the implications of secondary implied assumption of risk).
138. See Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex. 1974) (enunciating that a
"choice of evils" is not a choice at all in the context of voluntariness). In Marshall, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not assume the risk of injury because the
defendant left him with the option of "surrender[ing] his rights to use his real property or
risk criminal liability," neither of which was a valid option. Id. Thus, confrontation of the
danger presented was involuntary and there was no assumption of risk. Id.
139. BLACK'S LAw DiCrIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009) ("Law Latin 'to a willing person
it is not a wrong,' i.e., a person is not wronged by that to which he or she consents").

140. Jane P. North, Comment, Employees' Employees' Assumption of Risk: Real or
Illusory Choice?, 52 TENN. L. REV. 35, 38 (1984) (citing FRANCIS HERMANN BOHLEN, 2
CASES ON THE LAw OF TORTs 334 n.2 (F. Bohlen ed. 1930)).

141. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943).
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reliance upon the doctrine of assumption of risk.' 42 During the industrial
revolution, workplace safety was secondary to establishing industry
growth.14 3 The courts reasoned that workers voluntarily placed themselves in danger because they "were not forced to remain in any given
job," but could choose where to work and under what terms.14 4
However, in the second half of the nineteenth century courts began
reaching a different conclusion, finding "that the exigencies of keeping
one's job undercut the voluntariness of acts done at work."1 4 5 The U.S.
Congress passed the Federal Employer's Liability Act of 1908, but, assumption of risk defenses were only barred when an employer had
breached a statutory duty of care to the employee.146 In 1939, the doctrine was abrogated in the employment context when Congress amended
FELA to additionally provide that an "employee shall not be held to
have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where [ ] injury or
death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of the carrier."l 4 7
The Senate Committee Report justified the amendment by stating, "In
justice, the master ought to be held liable for injuries attributable to conditions under his control when they are not such as a reasonable man
ought to maintain in the circumstances."1 4 8 Congress felt the 1908 rule
"ignore[d] the fact that the master, and not the servant, [had] control
over the conditions which affect the safety of employees, and permit[ted]
the employer to be careless about the condition of his premises but, in
effect, placed a premium upon his carelessness."149 This same line of reasoning should apply to Texas Labor Code § 406.033(a), which also abolished assumption of risk as an affirmative defense;s 0 however,
examination of several Texas cases and their progeny reveals the defense
is still employed only in substance rather than in name.

142. North, supra note 140, at 40-42.
143. See Tiller, 318 U.S. at 59 ("The general purpose behind this development in the
common law seems to have been to give maximum freedom to expanding industry.");

North, supra note 139, at 40.
144. North, supra note 140, at 40.
145. Id. at 41.
146. Employers' Liability Act of 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-100, § 4, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 54 (2006)).
147. Id.
148. Tiller, 318 U.S. at 67 (citing Report of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess., Rept. No. 661, p. 4) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. at 67 n.21.
150. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a) (West Supp. 2012).
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"[An employer] owes no duty to warn of hazards that are
commonly known or already appreciated by the
employee." 5 1

By tracing the source of this "no-duty" rule and examining the application of the rule in other jurisdictions, 1 5 2 it is obvious the rule stems from
the doctrine of assumption of risk. Enunciating this "no-duty" rule, the
Texas Supreme Court in Elwood cited National Convenience Stores, Inc.
v. Matherne..s for this proposition, which stated, "[A]n employer has no
duty to adopt safety rules where its business is neither complex nor hazardous or where the dangers incident to the work are obvious or are of
common knowledge and fully understood by the employee." 1 54 As the
basis for this statement, Matherne cited Sloan v. Leger Mill Co., 15 s which
151. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006) (citing Nat'l Convenience
Stores Inc. v. Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no
pet.)).
152. See Hamilton v. Martinelli & Assocs., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168, 170 (Ct. App. 4th Dist.
2003), (employing the assumption of risk doctrine to deny an employee's recovery in an
action against her employer for an injury that occurred during training). A corrections
officer sued for injuries sustained during the course and scope of her employment while
she was performing training maneuvers. Id. at 171. The California appellate court held
that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred the officer's recovery because her
injuries were an inherent risk of performing the training maneuvers. Id. at 175. Because
her employment required training, because the injury was "rooted in the 'very occasion' of
her employment," and because she agreed to participate, she assumed the risk of her injury. Id. at 175-76.
153. Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In
Matherne, the administrator of employee's estate brought a wrongful death and survival
action on behalf of survivors against the employer, alleging negligence in connection with a
motor vehicle accident that occurred as the employee was returning to work after making a
bank deposit for the employer. Id. at 147. The court found the employer did not breach a
duty it owed to the decedent employee and the employer's conduct did not proximately
cause the decedent's fatal automobile accident that occurred after the decedent ran a stop
sign on his way to deposit daily store receipts. Id. at 149, 151. As the decedent was "a
licensed and experienced driver, he was legally responsible, independent of his employment, for knowing and obeying traffic laws." Id. at 149. The employer's actions did not
proximately cause the accident at bar as it had no duty to prevent the decedent, a fatigued
employee, from driving as it did not know of the fatigue and took no affirmative action to
place decedent on the road while fatigued. Id. at 151.
154. Matherne, 987 S.W.2d at 149; see Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794-95 (citing
Matherne).
155. Sloan v. Leger Mill Co., 161 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd
w.o.m.). In Sloan, the employee, while in the course of his employment and engaged in
driving a truck for the corporation, was injured when he wrecked his company truck and as
a result of his injuries, the employee died. Id. at 334-35. His widow collected workers'
compensation insurance from the employer's insurance carrier for the death of her husband, and she brought her action based exclusively on the alleged gross negligence of the
employer. Id. at 334. She alleged that, after having worked for eighteen hours, he was
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declared, "A servant assumes the risk of physical injury to himself sustained by reason of his overtaxing his strength or powers of endurance in
doing the work for which he is employed, when the occasion presents no
emergency requiring hasty action." 5 6
It is clear that the decedent's family in Sloan was receiving workers'
compensation benefits and was not bringing a nonsubscriber cause of action; thus, the family could only recover punitive damages resulting from
the employer's gross negligence.'5 Absent protection of § 406.033 penalty provisions, assumption of risk was used to defend against the plaintiff's claim.'5 s Furthermore, in the applicable portion cited by Matherne,
the Sloan court relied on Crews v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co.,' which
also hinged upon whether or not the injured employee assumed the risk
of injury.1 6 0

ordered to drive parts to another driver who had broken down. Id at 335. On the return
trip, he lost control of his truck, and was killed in the accident. Id. On appeal from the
judgment in favor of the employer, the appellate court affirmed, holding that a failure to
make rules and regulations for the protection of its employees did not constitute gross
negligence, especially when that failure was not the proximate cause of an injury. Id. at
336-37. Most importantly, the court ruled decedent assumed the risk of his injury by making the last trip when he was exhausted. Id. at 337.
156. Id. at 337.
157. See id. at 347 (referring to the difficulty of proving gross negligence).
158. See TEX. LAB. CorDE ANN. § 406.033 (West Supp. 2012) (applying only to nonsubscribers in precluding the use of assumption of the risk).
159. Crews v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 149 S.W.2d 1079 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1941, writ
dism'd). In Crews, the employee was injured when he fell from the employer's employer's
train engine while lubricating it in theat nighttime at the employer's roundhouse yard. Id.
at 1080. The employee contended that the employer failed to furnish a hostler's stool or
ladder after repeated requests and that such failure was negligence and the proximate
cause of the employee's employee's injury. Id. The employer claimed that the employee
assumed the risk and was contributorily negligent. Id. The court held that the evidence
"[did] not show, as a matter of law, that the [employee] assumed the risk incident to continuing his work as an assistant hostler without the aid of a hostler's hostler's stool" and
thus remanded the case due to the improper directed verdict granted by the trial court. Id.
at 1085.
160. Id. According to this court:
From the foregoing authorities we think it is clear that an exception to the general rule
(that a servant, with knowledge and appreciation of the danger in using defective machinery furnished by the master, who continues in the employment assumes the risk) is
generally recognized when the servant complains of the defect, the master promises to
correct it, and the servant continues to work with the defective machinery, or instrument, relying upon the promise of reparation, provided (1) the danger is not so imminent and obvious that a reasonably prudent person would not continue to work,
regardless of the promise, and (2) the servant does not continue to work after he can
no longer reasonably expect, or does not expect, the master to keep his promise.
Id.
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The no-duty rule, which applies when conditions are open and obvious,
originated in older Texas case law, which did not originate under the nonsubscriber statute; most importantly, it originally applied in an assumption of risk analysis. Clearly, the Texas Supreme Court cited case law
that did not arise under § 406.033 and applied the affirmative defense of
assumption of risk to Elwood in theory, though not by name.161
The use of the doctrine of assumption of risk in this context is even
more apparent when considering two Texas "slip and fall" cases that discuss such injuries in the premises liability context, prior to the abrogation
of assumption of risk. In Rosas v. Buddie's Food Store,1 62 a customer
filed suit after slipping on accumulated water inside the entrance of the
store on a rainy day, causing substantial injury.'6 ' The Texas Supreme
Court held that under the traditional assumption of risk defense, "an invitee who is held to be charged with knowledge of a defect, i.e., one which
is open and obvious, and who proceeds to encounter it, has voluntarily
assumed the risk of any injuries incurred thereby, and for this reason is
precluded from any recovery."1 6 4 As complete preclusion from recovery
is the harshest result, the Texas Supreme Court discussed the necessity of
abolishing the traditional defense in negligence cases and abrogating the
defense with a newly adopted doctrine of comparative negligence.' 6 5
Comparing Rosas with Aleman v. Ben E. Keith Co., 166 the use of assumption of risk principles in practice-though not by name-is evident.
In Aleman, a nonsubscriber "slip and fall" case, the employee sustained
injury while delivering goods to a restaurant. 167 While unloading mer-

161. See Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794-95 (Tex. 2006) (citing Matherne-a nonsubscriber case, which in turn cites Sloan-a gross negligence case against a
subscribing employer); Sloan, 161 S.W.2d at 337 (citing the root of Elwood's "no duty"
rule). Furthermore, the premise can also be found in works of legal scholars that discuss
the doctrine and its applicability to these situations. For instance, in The Law of Torts,
Dan Dobbs stated, "The traditional assumption of risk rules found ... such tacit consent
when the plaintiff, knowing of the risk and appreciating its quality, voluntarily chose to
confront it." DAN B. DO313S ET AL., I THE LAW OF TORTS § 235 (2nd ed., Thompson
Reuters 2011). Another scholar asserted that if a plaintiff fully comprehends a risk or if a
risk is obvious, he has assumed the risk by entering into the relationship or situation.
Fowuis V. HARPER ET AL., 4 HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 21.1 (3rd ed. 2007).
162. Rosas v. Buddie's Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1975).
163. Id. at 536.
164. Id. at 538 (recognizing the rule, but holding that this danger was not so open and
obvious as to protect the employer from any liability when it was asserted as a general
denial and remanding the case for review using contributory negligence).
165. See id. at 539 (discussing the possibility of abolishing the defense of assumption
of risk).
166. Aleman v. Ben E. Keith Co., 227 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, no pet.).
167. Id. at 308.
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chandise from his trailer with a dolly, he slipped on the ramp leading to
the ground because water pooled on the floor of his trailer from a leaking
refrigeration unit.' 6 8
One of the injured employee's theories of recovery was based on the
fact that his employer failed to warn him of the hazardous condition.' 6 9
In assessing the employee's claim, the appellate court cited Elwood and
Skiles, holding that "an employer owes no duty to warn of hazards that
are commonly known or already appreciated by the employee" and that
"[t]he danger associated with water on a floor is commonly known and
The employer "did not breach a duty because no
obvious to anyone."'
duty to warn [arose] in this context."7
Now compare Rosas and Aleman: both cases discuss the known danger
of water on the floor. In one case employer argued the obviousness of
water on the floor due to rain,172 and in the other employer argued the
obviousness of water on the floor because of a leak in the refrigeration
unit.173 In both cases, courts invoked the principle that a party who encounters a defect that is open and obvious voluntarily assumes the risks
of that defect and, therefore, no duty is owed.17 4
As is the case in assessing primary assumption of risk, the effect of a
finding the plaintiff assumed the risk is that the defendant does not have
a duty to protect the plaintiff from an open and obvious defect. 7 5 Thus,
it is clear that in Aleman, a nonsubscriber case which could not utilize the
assumption of risk defense, the court merely applied the assumption of
risk doctrine in holding that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty
because the risk was open and obvious.17 6 In Rosas, the court labeled
this "assumption of risk,""17 both as an affirmative defense and as an attack on duty; whereas in Aleman, the court did not use the phrase "assumption of risk" because § 406.033 prohibits the affirmative defense and

168. Id.
169. Id. at 313.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Rosas v. Buddie's Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. 1975).
173. Aleman, 227 S.W.3d at 308.
174. Rosas, 518 S.W.2d at 538; Aleman, S.W.3d at 313 (holding the danger was open
and obvious).
175. See Hamilton v. Martinelli & Assocs., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168, 1735 (Ct. App. 4th
Dist. 2003) (discussing primary assumption of risk in the employment context as a "no
duty" rule).
176. Aleman, 227 S.W.3d at 313.
177. Id.; Rosas, 518 S.W.2d at 538-39 (remanding to lower court to determine whether
or not the wet floor was a "dangerous condition").
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instead attacked the duty element of the plaintiff's prima facie case and
concluded the employer had "no duty." 78
The Fifth Circuit recently undertook this same analysis in determining
whether or not this "no duty" rule necessarily applies the assumption of
risk affirmative defense. 7 9 In applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit concluded, "[A] non-subscribing employer cannot escape liability in Texas
based solely on its employee's knowledge of the risk at issue. That is
because the employee's subjective awareness of the hazard is relevant
only to comparative negligence or assumption-of-the-risk-affirmative
defenses unavailable to non-subscribers under Section 406.033(a) of the
Texas Labor Code."o8 0 The no-duty rule cited by Elwood is, therefore, by
definition, assumption of risk-a defense prohibited by Texas Labor
Code § 406.033(a).st
In the final award issued following Mr. Castillo's arbitration, the Arbitrator parroted, "[An Employer has no duty to warn of dangers commonly known or already appreciated by the employee."' 8 2 The crux of
assumption of risk in Texas "turn[s] on whether or not it is established
that the plaintiff knew he was exposing himself to the danger which
caused him harm."'
The Arbitrator found, "[C]laimant knew to not
ride on the forklift with hands and feet outside the running lines of the
equipment."184 By critiquing Mr. Castillo's actions, knowledge, and
training in determining that he appreciated the risk of the danger that
was "commonly known," the Arbitrator was analyzing his actions under
the doctrine of assumption of risk. Although in name only, this finding of
no-duty was in fact a finding of primary assumption of risk-a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet.'

178. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.033 (stating assumption of the risk is a prohibited
defense); Aleman, 227 S.W.3d at 313.
179. Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., No. 12-10772, 2013 WL 5420317 (5th Cir. Sept. 27,
2013).
180. Id. at *7.
181. See Tu~x. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033 (West Supp. 2012) (stating assumption of
the risk is a prohibited defense); Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006)
(reciting the no-duty rule).
182. Castillo v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P., No. 70 160 00432 10, at 3 (American Arbitration Association 2011) (Lea, Arb.) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review On
Race and Social Justice).
183. Rosas v. Buddie's Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 538-39 (Tex. 1975).
184. Castillo v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P., No. 70 160 00432 10, at 1 (American Arbitration Association 2011) (Lea, Arb.) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review On
Race and Social Justice).
185. "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet" is a commonly quoted part of a
dialogue in William Shakespeare's play Romeo and Juliet, in which Juliet argues that the
names of things do not matter, only what things "are."
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"When an employee's injury results from performing the same
character of work that employees in that position have always
done, an employer is not liable if there is no evidence
that the work is unusually precarious."186

The "character of work" defense used predominantly in Elwood and
Skiles originated from Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Evans.'87 The
Texas Supreme Court held that when an employee is performing the
"same character of work" to which he and employees in similar stores are
accustomed, there is no negligence on behalf of the employer because
those were inherent risks assumed by the employee in the job he was
hired to perform. 1' The reasoning in Evans imputes primary implied assumption of risk. The court held that the employer had no duty to protect the employee from risks that were inherent to the job being
performed. 8 9
A good comparator case upon which primary implied assumption of
risk was relied and accepted by the court, is the Texas Supreme Court's
holding in Phi Delta Theta Co. v. Moore.' 90 In Moore, the court held that
"a defendant does not owe a duty to protect a participant from risks inherent in the sport or activity in which the participant has chosen to take

186. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 795 (citing Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex.
1995)).
187. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Evans. 175 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1943). In his nonsubscriber cause of action, Evans alleged that his employer "was guilty of negligence,
which proximately caused his injury, by requiring him to carry . . . 100-pound sacks of
potatoes [seventy-five to eighty feet] without someone to assist him, or without furnishing
him a truck or some other mechanical means on which to haul them." Id. at 250. As a
"strong, robust young man," Evans was merely required to continue executing the work he
had done for this employer for months prior. Id. at 251. This required "doing the same
character of work that other employees in other grocery stores constantly and generally
did," and "doing the same character of work that he constantly and generally did in other
grocery stores where he had been employed prior to his employment by A&P." Id. at
250-51. The court ruled that Evans could "not complain if A&P merely required him to
do the usual and customary work required of persons in his line of employment, or, stated
in another way, required by the character of the business in which he was employed." Id.
at 251. Additionally, the court concluded that the record failed to show that A&P should
have foreseen this injury. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
The question of the existence of negligence and its degree generally depends upon the
facts of each case; and if it consists of an omission to perform a duty devolved upon
the person charged with negligence, it must be considered with reference to the character of the business in which the person is engaged.
Id.
190. Phi Delta Theta Co. v. Moore, 10 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. 1999).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

29

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 1, Art. 2

THE SCHOLAR

88

[Vol. 16:59

part,"'9 based upon implied assumption of risk.19 2 Therefore, the organization responsible for organizing and administering the game was not
responsible when a participant was struck in the eye by a paintball because that risk was inherent to the activity.1 93 Shouldn't we recognize
that there is obviously an intrinsic difference between assuming risks in
the employment context and assuming risks in the recreational context?
Holding that an employee assumes risks which are inherent to his employment fundamentally disturbs and frustrates the intent of the Texas
Legislature in enacting § 406.033 and runs afoul of precedent set by Congress in enacting a similar FELA statute.' 9 4 Unsurprisingly, it is also inconsistent with courts across the country that have held, under the
doctrine of assumption of risk, the argument that an employee assumes
the inherent risks of injury in his or her employment is illusory.195 A
Georgia appellate court went even further than calling this a merely illusory argument, stating:
It goes without saying that all construction work is dangerous and if
we applied the doctrine of assumption of the risk, which the defendant desires the court to do here, there would be no construction
work, as all employees would immediately be required to walk off
the job or assume the risk of injury by waiving any negligence as to
anyone involved.' 9 6
The ramifications of such a "no-duty" rule are tremendous. In Mr.
Castillo's case, the Arbitrator found, "When an employee's injury results
from performing the same character of work employees in that position
have always done, an employer is not liable if there is no evidence that

191. Id. at 661. To support its statement of law, the Texas Supreme Court cited cases
from jurisdictions that have discussed primary implied assumption of risk, even though
assumption of risk was absorbed into comparative negligence principles in Texas. Id. at
661 n.25 (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708-09 (Cal. 1992); Morgan v. State, 685
N.E.2d 202, 208 (N.Y. 1997); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986).
192. Moore, 10 S.W.3d at 661.
193. Id. at 659-61.
194. See Employers' Liability Act of 1938Act of Aug. 11, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-382,
§ 4, 53 Stat. 1404, 1404 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 54 (2006)) (intending to transfer liability to the employer in regardless of the employee's negligence); Tiller v. Atlantic
Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 64 63 S. Ct. 444, 450 (1943) (citing Report of the
Senate Committee on Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Rept. No. 661, p. 4.noting that all
parties to the bill understood it "would utterly and completely abolish the defense of assumption of risk").
195. North, supra note 140, at 57 (citing Rhoades v. Serv. Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367,
381 (E.D. Ark. 1971)).
196. Kitchens v. Winter Co. Builders, 289 S.E.2d 807, 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
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the work is unusually precarious."'
This assertion again was snatched
directly from Elwood.' The Arbitrator found that Mr. Castillo operated
the forklift for approximately 600 hours and that he never sustained any
prior injuries while operating the forklift.1 99 In effect, Mr. Castillo was
among hundreds of employees hired to drive a forklift; thus, H.E.B. was
not liable without evidence that the work was "unusually precarious." If
we applied the Georgia Court's reasoning to Mr. Castillo's case, then all
forklift drivers would be required to walk off the job or assume the risk of
injury by waiving any negligence as to anyone involved since operating
heavy machinery, like forklifts, is dangerous in itself.
Rather than focusing on the inherent risks employees take through the
course and scope of their employment, Texas courts should determine
whether the employers acted as reasonably prudent employers under the
circumstances, which would include taking into account preventative
measures against inherent risks of which employers are aware. 2 0 0 As
demonstrated by both above examples, Texas courts apply the doctrine of
assumption of risk in substance though not by name.
B.

Contributory Negligence

Despite the shift from contributory negligence to comparative negligence and contributory fault principles, "contributory negligence" is still
used in describing the plaintiffs' conduct when failing to exercise care for
themselves. 201 According to the most recent Restatement of Torts:
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable
care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are
the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the
burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. 20 2

197. Castillo v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P., No. 70 160 00432 10 1, at 3 (American Arbitration Association 2011) (Lea, Arb.) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review On
Race and Social Justice).
198. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 795 (Tex. 2006).
199. Castillo v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P., No. 70 160 00432 10 1, at 1-2 (American
Arbitration Association 2011) (Lea, Arb.) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review On Race and Social Justice).
200. See generally North, supra note 140, at 35 (citing FELA and national case law in
arguing assumption of risk should not apply in the employment context).
201. DoI33S ET AL., supra note 161, at § 218.
202. RESTATE-MENT (THIRD) OF LAw TmintD, Tours: PHYSICAL & EMoTIONAL HARM

§ 3 (2010).
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This definition applies when analyzing both the defendant's negligence
and the plaintiff's contributory negligence.2 03 The Restatement makes a
distinction between the two in that "[a] defendant is held liable for negligent conduct primarily because that conduct creates a risk of harm to a
third party; the plaintiff's contributory negligence serves as at least a partial affirmative defense primarily because it exposes the plaintiff to a risk
of harm."20 4 The standard of appropriate conduct is based upon the reasonable person of ordinary prudence.20 5
In the context of cases arising under § 406.033, it is most important to
note that where assumption of risk is used to negate the defendant's duty,
contributory negligence is used as a defense to any implicated breach of
duty.20 6 If one studies cases finding in favor of the employer, it becomes
obvious that the injured employee's conduct is consistently considered by
Texas courts. Rather than focusing solely on whether or not the employer acted as a reasonably prudent employer under the circumstances,
courts continue to critique the actions of injured employees.
i. "A finding against [an injured employee] on this issue of sole
proximate cause would have prevented a recovery. "207
Generally, sole proximate cause is not submitted to Texas juries.
Rather courts submit, "(1) whether the plaintiff was guilty of any negligence; and (2) whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the accident." 2 08 By considering whether the plaintiff was guilty of any
negligence and what effect that negligence had on the plaintiff's injuries,
courts and nonsubscribing employers are necessarily applying the defense
of contributory negligence.

203. Id. § 3 cmt. b.
204. Id.
205. Id. § 3 cmt. a. In discussing contributory negligence, the Prosser treatise states
that the plaintiff is required to conform to the standard of conduct based on the reasonable
person of ordinary prudence. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF
Tours 453-54 (5th ed. 1984). "The unreasonableness of the risk which he incurs is judged
by the ... process of weighing the importance of the interest he is seeking to advance, and
the burden of taking precautions, against the probability and probable gravity of the anticipated harm . . ." Id.
206. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., 4 HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 22.2336
(3rd ed. Aspen Publishers 2007).
207. Najera v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 207 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. 1948).
208. 57B AM. JUR. 2 D NEGLIGENCE § 995 (2004); see Greater Houston Transp. Co. v.
Wilson, 725 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987 ("[T]he [employer]
would not have been entitled to a jury issue inquiring whether [the employee's] negligence
was a sole proximate cause of the accident because such an issue would have been an
inferential rebuttal issue.").
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In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 2 09 which discusses the causation element of a plaintiff's cause of action in a case arising under
FELA, the U.S. Supreme Court discusses implications of the abolition of
the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 2 1 0 Finding the Missouri Supreme Court's application of sole proximate cause incorrect, the Supreme Court explained "the [state] court held that despite
the defendant-employer's having been guilty of causal negligence, the
plaintiff-employee's negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries (such reasoning would be egregiously wrong, because FELA section
[three] abolishes the contributory negligence doctrine)." 2 1 1
Attempting to establish a proper proximate cause standard (requiring
the plaintiff to prove only that the injuries were the result "in whole or in
part" by the defendant's negligence,) 2 1 2 the Court emphasized that liability should be imposed when the employer's negligence "resulted at least
in part," "played any part, even the slightest," "played any part at all," or
"played any part, however small" in causing the employee's injury.21 3
The language in Rogers as well as the nature of FELA cases, due to the
abolition of the common-law defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, led the Supreme Court to conclude "that [FELA] does

209. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957). In Rogers, a railroad employee
was burning weeds near a train track. Id. at 501. His supervisor provided him with a hand
torch and told him to stop what he was doing "when a train passed and to take a position
off the tracks and ties to observe the journals of the passing train for hotboxes." Id. at 502.
Due to an oncoming train, the employee quit firing and ran on a path near a culvert. Id.
The train fanned the fire toward his direction, which caused the laborer to catch on fire,
and then he slipped and fell into the culvert in an attempt to retreat from the fire. Id.
Negligence was found because the testimony showed "that the burning off of weeds and
vegetation was ordinarily done with flamethrowers from cars on the tracks and not by a
workman on foot using a crude hand torch" and the employee stood where he did "in
furtherance of explicit orders to watch for hotboxes." Id. at 503.
210. Id. at 505-09.
211. David W. Robertson, Causation Issues in FELA and Jones Act Cases in the Wake
of Jones and McBride, 36 Tui. MAiz. L.J. 397, 399 (2012); see Rogers, 352 U.S. at 504-05
(criticizing the Missouri court for determining the employee's conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries). The Supreme Court also read the Missouri Supreme Court's
opinion to mean that "the plaintiff's negligence was at least as probable a proximate cause
of the accident as any negligence of the defendant, and therefore, the plaintiff should also
lose." Robertson, supra. Regardless of which way the decision is read, both options were
considered wrong because both implicated the defense of contributory negligence. Id.
(tracing the Rogers decision and its meaning).
212. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
213. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 504, 506-07; see Robertson, supra note 211, at 399-400 (discussing these four examples and their impact on the FELA causation standard). See generally Charles H. Traeger, III, Recent Development, Legal Cause, Proximate Cause, and
Comparative Negligence in the FELA, 18 SrAN. L. Ri~v. 929 (1966) (discussing the evolution of the proximate cause standard in the context of the federal legislation).
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not incorporate 'proximate cause' standards developed in nonstatutory
common-law tort actions;" instead, it only requires that "a defendant railroad caused or contributed to a plaintiff employee's injury if the railroad's negligence played any part in bringing about the injury."2 14
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of Texas Labor Code
§ 406.033(a) mirrors the "in whole or in part language" of FELA: "[A]n
employer whose fault, however slight, was a proximate cause of the injuries will owe full damages." 2 15
In his law review article cited by the Texas Supreme Court in Keng,
James Robertson anticipated that defendant employers would use the defense of sole proximate cause to circumvent the harsh effects of
§ 406.033.216 Describing the "guise" sole proximate cause defense as
"pernicious," the article states:
Allowing a defendant whose negligent conduct has been shown to be
a proximate cause of the harm to escape liability by pointing to the
victim's fault as 'sole proximate cause' would amount to smuggling
the abolished contributory negligence defense into these cases
through the back door. This 'sole proximate cause' fallacy has been
widely debunked in the general comparative fault literature. The
Texas decisions sometimes cited in support of the 'sole proximate
cause' argument contain some suggestive language but in fact do not
allow any such 'sole proximate cause' defense. Clearly the intended
meaning of the statutory abolition of the contributory negligence defense is that the victim's fault neither defeats nor diminishes recovery. One should not be able to avoid this effect by changing the
name of the victim-fault defense from 'contributory negligence' to
'sole proximate cause. '217
When courts state that the plaintiff's actions were the sole proximate
cause, they should be more specific as some applications of the phrase
directly conflict with § 406.033.218 The phrase itself implicates so many
different options: from the defendant employer not being negligent, to
the plaintiff employee being contributorily negligent, to the plaintiff em-

214. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (2011).
215. Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tex. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Robertson, supra note 8).
216. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1200-01 (arguing against the use of sole proximate
cause as a substitute for abolished contributory negligence defense).
217. Id.
218. See generally DoBBS ET AL., supra note 161, at § 214 (describing the phrase "sole
proximate cause" as "defense rhetoric" which "cloud[s] the court's holding with
ambiguity").
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ployee's negligent conduct being a superseding cause. 2 19 The second two
options necessarily violate the language of § 406.033 whereas the first option does not.22 0
In light of Supreme Court treatment in FELA cases, it is evident that
Texas courts should exercise more caution when applying the contributory negligence defense and the sole proximate cause.221 Furthermore,
courts should be wary of loose usage of the phrase "sole proximate
cause" so as to be clear on the ruling and to produce clear, consistent case
law that does not violate § 406.033's legislative intent.22 2
ii. "[An employer] has no duty to provide equipment or assistance
that is unnecessary to the job's safe performance. "223
The Texas Supreme Court cited Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v.
Warren,224 a lifting injury case, for this no-duty rule. Overturning the
219. See, e.g., id. at § 215 (asserting that "sole proximate cause" is used to mean both
that the defendant was not negligent and that the plaintiff's actions were a superseding
cause); FowiuER V. HARPER FT AL-., 4 HARPER, JAMES ANI) GRAY ON Tours § 22.2 (3rd

ed. 2007) ("The plaintiff is precluded from recovery by contributory negligence because in
the situations where the defense is applicable, that negligence is the sole proximate cause
of his injury."). In its discussion of sole proximate cause as a superseding cause, one treatise stated:
[S]ome cases hold that the plaintiff's fault may sometimes count as a superseding
cause, or, as courts often say, the "'sole proximate cause"' of the plaintiff's own harm.
If so, the plaintiff does not merely suffer a reduction in damages but is barred completely . .. . Although the abstract scope-of-risk test of superseding cause is the same
for both negligence of the defendant and the comparative fault of the plaintiff, the
superseding cause line of reasoning must be accepted with caution. If it were widely
applied, it would undermine the comparative negligence system of fault allocation. It
might also permit introduction of evidence that would be forbidden on the comparative fault issue. For this reason, a number of courts have rejected the possibility that
the plaintiff's fault can ever be a superseding cause.
DOB1S ET AL., supra note 161, at § 215; see also HARPER ET AL., supra at 333-34 (discussing the implications of contributory negligence on proximate cause). "The plaintiff is precluded from recovery by contributory negligence because in the situations where the
defense is applicable, that negligence is the sole proximate cause of his injury." Id. See
also Douns ET AL., supra, at 754 n.2 (stating sole proximate cause is sometimes used to
mean simply that the defendant was not negligent).
220. See Tix. LAB. CoDE ANN. § 406.033(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (prohibiting the
use of the defense of contributory negligence).
221. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (2011)
(describing a different proximate cause standard required for FELA cases).
222. See Robertson, supra note 8, at 1200-01 (describing the "fallacy" of the "sole
proximate cause" defense in nonsubscriber cases).
223. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 795 (Tex. 2006).
224. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Warren, 934 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1996, writ denied). Warren, one of Allsup's' managers, was injured while unloading cardboard boxes of milk. Id. at 435. She had requested a male be scheduled to unload
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jury's verdict in favor of the injured employee, the appellate court held
"because the evidence showed that the unloading of the trucks may be
performed in the usual and proper way in safety without a protective
back brace or safety belt, Warren did not evince that Allsup's was under a
duty to furnish the protective instrumentality." 2 2 5 The court cited St.
Louis Southwestern Railway Co. of Texas v. Weatherly226 for this
assertion.
The Weatherly court considered whether the employer's failure to provide suitable tools and personal protective equipment were the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's eye injuries. 2 27 The applicable portion cited by the
Warren court stated:
[W]hen the particular service may be performed in the usual and
proper way in safety without the use of any protective appliance,
then the master is under no obligation to furnish such an appliance.
The failure to furnish a safety appliance cannot be regarded as the
proximate cause of an injury when, by the use of proper tools and
the adoption of a proper method, the service could have been performed without exposure to danger. The master is not required to
do an unnecessary thing, or to furnish something which the servant
does not need to enable him to discharge in safety his duty to the
master. Clearly the master is not required to provide protection
against a danger which he should not anticipate might arise.2 28
Since this employee's injury could be anticipated based on the circumstances, the employer had a duty to provide personal protective equipthe trucks; however, on this day Warren was by herself and no one came to help her even
after she telephoned for help. Id. at 435. The jury found Allsup's was twenty-five percent
negligent in causing her injuries, but the appellate court overturned the jury's finding,
holding that Warren failed to establish duty or proximate cause. Id at 43637. The court
stated that Warren was in charge of scheduling and failed to ensure that a male employee
was scheduled to unload this shipment (a young male was scheduled to work and failed to
show up). Id. at 437. Additionally, "Allsup's had no duty to Warren to control the scheduled employee's' conduct." Id. The court also stated found that Warren failed to present
any evidence showing that Allsup's owed her a duty to provide her with a back-brace,
safety belt, or additional assistance and also failed to show that this failure, if any, was the
proximate cause of her injury. Id. at 437-38.
225. Id. at 438.
226. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Weatherly, 2 S.W.2d 555, 558-59 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1928). In Weatherly, an employee was injured when a piece of metal flew into his eye while
he was tightening a nut with a hammer and chisel without using protective goggles. Id. at
556. Because the court was convinced that the employee would not have used goggles had
they been available to him, the court ruled the employer was not negligent in failing to
provide protective equipment or reasonably safe tools. Id. at 559-60.
227. Id. at 558.
228. Id. at 558-59.
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ment to the employee.22 9 Yet despite this fact, the court decided there
was no evidence that the employee would have worn the protective gear
had they been provided; therefore, the employee failed to establish proximate cause. 3 0
This same argument and line of reasoning has been discussed ad
nauseam by legal scholars in the assumption of risk and contributory negligence context.23 Because the defense of contributory negligence is unavailable in these cases, determining whether or not the defendant
employer was negligent should emphasize the foreseeability and reasonableness of the plaintiff's choice rather than the plaintiff's actions
themselves.2 3 2
Indeed, the Supreme Court's short decision in Ringhiser v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway Co. 2 3 3 is particularly enlightening. In Ringhiser, the employee was injured while using a gondola car (railroad car) as a restroom.23 4 Despite access to other facilities,2 35 the Supreme Court held the
defendant employer liable because the employer knew that employees
frequently used gondola cars as restrooms and therefore acted negligently
in failing to take actions to prevent injuries to workers.23 6 While the facts
of this case seem outlandish, it emphasizes that when defendants are unable to use the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk,
the analysis changes and focuses on the foreseeability of harm.2 3 7
By comparing two similar cases, one arising out of FELA and one arising under § 406.033, the differences in the analysis are even clearer and
229. Id. at 559. Despite this fact, the court decided there was no evidence that the
employee would have worn the goggles had they been provided; therefore, the employee
failed to establish proximate cause. Id. at 560.
230. Id.
231. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 219, at § 21.
Where a traveler uses a highway that has not been closed for repairs[,] [i]t is sometimes said that there must be 'no other convenient safer way,' but this statement
comes from confusion. The condition it implies is not valid for any of the situations
here being discussed. The existence of a safer alternative may make the plaintiffs
choice of this one an unreasonable, hence negligent, choice. But it does not bar the
plaintiff's recovery merely because he voluntarily chose the more dangerous way. If
that choice was reasonable one in the circumstances, it will not prevent recovery.
Id.
232. See id. at § 21.1 (discussing the plaintiffs contributory negligence in relation to
the foreseeability and reasonableness of those actions); see also Weatherly, 2 S.W.2d at
558-59 (ruling based on foreseeability of the injury).
233. Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 354 U.S. 901 (1957) (per curiam).
234. Id. at 902 (Clark, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 904 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 901.
237. See id. at 1094 (focusing, in one paragraph, entirely on the employer's knowledge
that employees used gondola cars for that purpose).
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overwhelmingly demonstrate the consequences of using contributory negligence in Texas courts. In Wilkerson v. McCarthy,238 a 1949 U.S. Supreme Court case, an employee was injured when he took a more
dangerous shortcut rather than using the longer, safer alternative. 23 9 The
Court stated, "For while petitioner's failure to use a safer method of
crossing might be found by the jury to be contributory negligence, the
[FELA] provides that 'contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery;"'
therefore, the injured employee could prevail despite opting for a
shortcut.2 40
Under similar circumstances but reaching a different conclusion, in
Brown v. Holman,241 an employee was injured when he utilized a more
dangerous shortcut rather than a safer alternative available to him.242 In
upholding the employer's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Texas appellate court found the employee's actions were the sole proximate cause
of his injuries.2 43 Rather than focusing on the foreseeability of harm, the
court focused on the options available to the employee and not the lack
of instruction by the employer.24 4 By not providing Mr. Brown any instruction, tools, or other equipment, the employer avoided liability by
leaving all choices, and therefore all liability, to the unprotected employee. 2 45 Once again, instead of the relevant inquiry being whether the
employer was at least one percent negligent in not providing any instruction, tools, or other equipment, the focus was on the plaintiff's actions.
In Mr. Castillo's case, the Arbitrator focused heavily on Mr. Castillo's
knowledge, actions, and choices rather than on the foreseeability of Mr.
Castillo's injury.246 Based on the outcome, however, the Arbitrator

238. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 (1949).
239. Id. at 58-60.
240. Id. at 61.
241. Brown v. Holman, 335 S.W.3d 792, 792 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet.).
242. Id. at 794.
243. Id. at 797.
244. Id. at 795-97.
245. See id. at 796-97 ("[Employer] did not require [employee] to negotiate the fence
in a particular manner. He was free to choose to load the truck over or through the fence
rails, or at a gate. He chose to scale the fence while carrying the clay mold in both hands.").
246. Mr. Castillo presented evidence that H.E.B. knew that, despite its lackluster
training efforts, its employees consistently, most likely unconsciously, operated its forklifts
with their limbs outside the running lines of the vehicle. H.E.B. discussed options on how
to modify the forklifts to physically prevent employees from exposing their limbs because
it knew employees were doing this and it was dangerous, but chose not to implement any
changes that would have eliminated the foreseeable risk to its employees. H.E.B. also had
knowledge of a prior severe injury, but rather than taking affirmative steps to prevent
future injuries, H.E.B. continued to rely on each employee's own conscientiousness in operating the forklifts. H.E.B failed to provide a docking area for the forklifts so they would
not be in the way of other workers, as was the case with Mr. Castillo. H.E.B. also failed to
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chose to focus on Mr. Castillo's actions rather than focusing on the foreseeability of Mr. Castillo's injury from H.E.B.'s perspective at the time of
Mr. Castillo's injury, and detailing why each of the alleged acts of negligence lodged against H.E.B. did not constitute negligent acts or proximate causes of Mr. Castillo's injury.
iii.

Based on the subjective characteristics of the plaintiff, the
defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty.

Texas courts have considered an injured employee's education level,247
experience in the field,24 8 and physical capabilities249 in cases arising
under § 406.033. In analyzing a plaintiff's contributory negligence the
Restatement of Torts states, "If an actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor has
behaved as a reasonably careful person." 2 5 0 In a contributory negligence
analysis, the reasonable person standard considers the individual characteristics of the parties, such as age or mental aptitude, instead of being an
objective standard.2 5 1
By applying the reasonable person standard, and thus considering the
age, experience, and physical capabilities of a plaintiff, Texas courts are
evaluating a plaintiff employee's contributory negligence, which is explicitly prohibited by § 406.033(a)(1). For example, in Allen v. A & T Transportation Co., Inc.,252 the Texas appellate court cited Farley v. M M Cattle
Co. 25 3 in holding the defendant employer did not have a duty to train,
supervise, or warn the injured employee based on the employee's age and
install column protectors to shield damage to the columns, forklifts, and employees in the
case of a collision.
247. See Alashmawi v. IBP, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 162, 172 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet.
denied) (holding that the employer had no duty to warn a college-educated chemist).
248. See Allen v. A & T Transp. Co., Inc., 79 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, pet denied) (holding that the employer had no duty to warn a truck driver with nine
years of experience).
249. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Evans, 175 S.W.2d 249,251 (Tex. 1943) (holding
that the employer had no duty to protect the "strong, robust young man" from injuries due
to lifting heavy sacks of potatoes).
250. RES-I'ATEMNTI' (TFIHRD) oiF LAw THIRD, Towitrs: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 12 (2010).
251. HARPER ET AL., supra note 219, at § 22.1.
252. Allen, 79 S.W.3d at 70.
253. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975), abrogated on other
grounds by Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978) (holding a court must
consider the age and experience of an employee because "it may be negligent to furnish a
minor with, or fail to supervise the minor in the operation of, a certain instrumentality
when to take the same action with a grown man or an experienced employee would not
constitute negligence").
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experience.25 4 When analyzing M M Cattle Co.'s defense of contributory
negligence, the Texas Supreme Court stated, "Although there was testimony that this procedure was dangerous, there was also testimony that it
was commonly used. We do not feel it could be said as a matter of law
that a reasonable fifteen-year-old boy under the same or similar circumstances would not have used this same procedure." 2 5 5 By the Texas Supreme Court's own definition, considering the age and experience of the
injured party is an evaluation of the party's contributory negligence.2 56
The Arbitrator in Anthony Castillo's case also focused on his experience and familiarity with the forklift on which he was injured. The Arbitrator specifically cited H.E.B.'s contentions that Mr. Castillo spent
approximately 600 hours on a forklift prior to his injury.2 5 7 By analyzing
his prior experience, the Arbitrator incorrectly considered principles of
contributory negligence when such defense is unavailable by statutory
prohibition.2 58
V.

CONCLUSION: WHY YOU SHOULD CARE

While this analysis may seem insignificant in light of issues that lay
within the workers' compensation system,2 59 the effects of these Texas
Supreme Court rulings impact us all. By not requiring that Texas employers bear the burden of on-the-job injuries, all Texans suffer the
consequences.
The general public is forced to incur the costs of these injuries through
funding programs such as Social Security Disability, Medicare, Medicaid,
unemployment, and other public and private health care funding programs. 2 6 0 According to the most recent statistics, Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance covers approximately one billion dollars in medical

254. Allen, 79 S.W.3d at 70.
255. Farley, 529 S.W.2d at 757.
256. Id. ("Rather, the reasonableness of an actor's conduct in confronting a risk will
be determined under principles of contributory negligence.").
257. Castillo v. HEB Grocery Co., L.P., No. 70 160 00432 10 1 (American Arbitration
Association 2011) (Lea, Arb.) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review On Race
and Social Justice).
258. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012).
259. See generally Jill Williford, Comment, Reformers' Regress: The 1991 Texas Workers' Compensation Act, 22 S-r. MARY'S L.J. 1111, 1111 (1991) (identifying and discussing
issues still plaguing workers' compensation such as election of remedy, occupational disease, seasonal and lower-paid workers, medical care and hardship advances, income benefits and impairment ratings, access to legal remedies, and attorneys' fees, among others).
260. See Ohana, supra note 22, at 352 (stating that the costs are borne by injured
employees and society as a whole).
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benefits alone each year. 2 6 1 This statistic only covers two-thirds of the
state's employers, as approximately thirty-three percent of Texas employers are nonsubscribers.2 6 2 With laborers who do not generally have
means to cover approximately $935.00 to $681,615.00 in medical expenses
per injury263 comprising the majority of those suffering workplace injuries,264 the general public is subsequently expected and required to take
on the financial burden of these injuries.
In an old national study conducted in 1992, it was determined that injured or ill workers and their families absorbed about forty-four percent
of the costs, while Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and other government accounts contributed eighteen percent, or roughly $28.5 billion.265
Imagine if these figures translated into today's costs and then imagine
that workers' compensation insurance and the employer did not contribute any medical costs or lost wages.
Employers who choose to not carry workers' compensation insurance
do so with knowledge of the potential consequences. They subjectively
appreciate the risk of liability absent significant common-law affirmative
defenses, voluntarily confront this risk, and thus manifest the willingness
to accept the consequences of this decision. 2 6 6 In light of their own thoroughly calculated assumption of risk, is it necessary to protect nonsubscribing employers, like Wal-Mart, Kroger and H.E.B., who can more
easily bear the burden of workplace injuries and who can affect the safety
climate in their workplace? 6 1 Moreover, considering that courts should
construe the Workers' Compensation Act in favor of injured employees,
261. TEx. DEP'r OF INs. WORKERS' COME.

RESEARCH AND EVALUATION GRv.,

HEALTIi CARE COST AND UTILIZATION IN ITHE TiXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM

1998-2011 5 (2012), available at http://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/regulation/roc/.
262. Tx. DEP'T OF INS., supra note 21.
263. See J. Paul Leigh, Economic Burden of Occupational Injury and Illness in the
United States, in 89 Tim MILBANK Q. 728, 737 (2011) (citing average medical costs per
injury ranging from $935.00 for nonfatal injuries with no days away from work to $681,615

for nonfatal injuries resulting in permanent total disability).
264. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Requiring Days Away from Work, 2011, at 2 (Nov. 8,
2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcdnew.htm (stating laborers suffered injuries at
a rate three times greater than the rate for all other private industry workers).
265. J. PAUL LEIGH E-T AL., COSTS OF OCCUPATIONAL INIURIs ANI) I luNESSIS 11
(University of Michigan Press, 2000), available at http://www.press.umich.edu/16885/costs

of-occupational-injuries and-illnesses.
266. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 775 (defining implied secondary assumption of risk).

267. See U.S.
TION, AL-

DEiPT OF LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTii ADMINISTRAAnour OSHA, 9 (2013), available at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/all

aboutOSHA.pdf (discussing the burden on employers to control safety and limit workrelated injuries).
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why are courts permitting use of statutorily prohibited defenses in substance, though not in name?
All of the attacked citations from the Texas Supreme Court in the preceding analysis-from the no-duty rules applied in cases involving open
and obvious dangers and inherent risks of injury due to the character of
work performed; to decisions based on the employee's own negligence,
disguised as the antiquated idea of "sole proximate cause;" to conclusions
which consider the employee's age, experience, physical capabilities, and
reasonable alternatives-all implicate the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Courts circumvent statutory
penalty by simply not labeling or defining these defenses. However, application of these defenses is substantively clear: if it walks like a duck,
quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck . . . it must be a duck. No

matter how it is disguised, it is still a duck. Texas courts should stop
manipulating these defenses in order to apply them in nonsubscriber
cases and should allow enterprising Texas employers to experience the
consequence for their own poor business decisions and the subsequent
liability-that is their responsibility, not the general public's. With judicial assistance, these nonsubscribing employers continue to operate, some
very profitably,2 68 while socializing the cost of injured employees onto
society. The calculus is lucrative, but the economic consequences for injured employees, the economy, and society as a whole are
astronomical.2 6 9
To properly allocate these costs, Texas courts must follow the text of
the statute which clearly outlines available and unavailable defenses, and
the intent of the statute, which was created to penalize employers who
affirmatively choose cost savings over responsibility by not opting into
the workers' compensation system. Texas courts should look to Supreme
Court decisions in FELA cases for guidance in crafting appropriate decisions consistent with the statutory construction of Texas Labor Code
§ 406.033. It is at best disingenuous for Texas courts to maintain that
injured employees should be favored, while not affording thousands of
injured employees remedies statutorily granted to them.
For the rest of his life, twenty-five year old Anthony Castillo will be
haunted by his injury, the loss of his toes and part of his foot, with the
268. See generally Tex. Dep't of Ins., Workers' Compensation Insurance Coverage
Verification, Non-Subscribers, http://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/employer/nonsubscriber/Non
SubDownLDReport.pdf (last updated Sept. 11, 2013) (providing a regularly updated list
of nonsubscribers in Texas). Examples of large Texas non-subscribers include H.E.B., Kroger, Wal-Mart, Target, Home Depot, Lowe's, McDonald's, Whataburger, Taco Cabana,
and Jack in the Box.
269. See Leigh, supra note 263, at 730 (estimating that on-the-job injuries and illnesses
cost approximately $250 billion nationally in 2007).
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knowledge that H.E.B. had the opportunity and means to prevent it and,
by not doing so, should have been forced to assume responsibility for
$250,000.00 in estimated future medical expenses. Without guaranteed
lifetime medical benefits, which he would have been entitled to under
workers' compensation, Mr. Castillo is at the mercy of H.E.B for his future medical care. As he grows older he will most likely be reliant upon
Social Security disability and other government assistance, leaving the
public to shoulder the cost of his injury. Had the Texas Supreme Court in
Elwood, Skiles, and Goss properly applied Texas Labor Code § 406.033,
the arguments shown above would not have become part of Texas nonsubscriber case law and would not have dictated the Arbitrator's decision
in Mr. Castillo's case. Courts must properly apply § 406.033 to conform
to the Legislature's intent and must not use these legal constructions to
bypass statutory penalties. In so doing, employers will properly bear the
burden of workplace injuries and the true intent of the Workers' Compensation Act, protection for injured employees, will be realized.
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